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Abstract
The challenges of climate change affect all aspects of the economy, including 
financial stability, which may be affected both by the physical risks (associated with 
the climate change process itself) and the transition risks (associated with initiatives 
to curb the climate change process). This article presents a model designed to 
produce macroeconomic scenarios, chiefly related to transition risks, to serve as a 
basis for stress tests to verify that all the components of the financial system are 
prepared for possible adverse events of this type. In particular, these scenarios are 
based on a hypothetical rise in the price of CO2 emission allowances, over a 2-5 year 
horizon. The model simulates the impact of this shock on the Spanish economy, 
paying particular attention to sectoral asymmetries arising from the intensity with 
which different types of energy are used in each industry, the interdependencies 
summarised in the input-output tables for the Spanish economy and the general 
equilibrium effects in terms of relative price changes and sectoral reallocation.
1 Introduction
The challenges of climate change affect all aspects of the economy, including 
financial stability. Both the physical risks and the transition risks may have asymmetric 
effects that reveal a special vulnerability in certain sectors or firms, so that under the 
most pessimistic scenarios, some financial institutions1 may find themselves in 
difficulty if they are poorly diversified in these newly relevant dimensions. Bank 
stress tests attempt to anticipate the possible emergence of this type of problem. To 
carry out such tests, quantitative tools are required to simulate the effects of shocks 
and their transmission throughout the economy and financial system. This article 
presents one of the elements being prepared for these climate change stress tests: 
a sectoral model capable of generating macroeconomic scenarios to serve as the 
starting point of the exercise. As the model is still under development and the current 
objective is merely to begin to communicate the preparation process for these 
scenarios, this article only addresses the main features of the model and the type of 
results it can generate. In particular, no details are provided (for the time being) 
about the effects of the simulated shock on specific sectors.
Physical risks are those associated with the process of climate change. These 
include, inter alia, rising temperatures, ice melt and sea level rises, a higher frequency 
1 These include not only banks, but also other financial intermediaries, such as insurance companies and investment 
funds, which are closely linked to banks in Spain. In principle, the scenarios generated by this model may be used 
to analyse the effects of the shock on all of them.
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and intensity of adverse atmospheric phenomena, progressive degradation of 
environmental variables, such as air and water quality, deforestation and biodiversity 
loss.2 These risks are already beginning to materialise, causing significant damage 
(to capital goods and real estate, for example), reductions in productivity and ad hoc 
disruptions to production chains. They can be expected to continue increasing for 
decades, so that the most adverse effects will be concentrated in the long run.
Transition risks, on the other hand, are those associated with initiatives to stop the 
climate change process: raising the cost of emission allowances, new taxes and 
subsidies to accelerate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, new regulations 
requiring changes in agents’ behaviour to obtain these results, technological changes 
that increase the rate at which capital is depreciated when replaced by less polluting 
options, or even consumer preference changes prompting a producer response, 
etc.  In the political sphere, the development of climate change legislation also 
affects financial institutions: for example, the European Commission’s “Action Plan: 
Financing Sustainable Growth” seeks to redirect capital flows towards sustainable 
investment, and the Taxonomy Regulation, also approved by the European 
Commission, defines the criteria for classifying economic activity environmentally. 
Legislative developments may also affect financial institutions’ asset portfolios, 
including the EU Green Bond Standard, which will potentially have an impact on 
asset valuations, the inclusion of environmental aspects in the European Central 
Bank’s (ECB) bank stress tests, and, more generally the ECB’s mandate review.3 In 
the case of physical risks, the greatest danger is that actions end up being insufficient 
to change the current course of climate change and avert the most pessimistic 
scenarios in the long term. This extended time frame should mitigate the implicit 
risks to financial stability, allowing institutions to adapt their exposure to different 
firms and sectors smoothly over time; even so, given the potential extent of these 
risks, they will also need to be evaluated quantitatively. In the case of transition risks, 
however, there is a greater probability of observing potentially sizeable effects within 
more limited time periods, especially if a disorderly transition amplifies the short-
term costs.4
The model presented in this article is designed to produce macroeconomic scenarios, 
chiefly relating to transition risks, to serve as the basis for stress tests to verify that 
every part of the financial system is prepared for possible adverse events of this 
type. In particular, these scenarios will be based on a hypothetical rise in the price 
of CO2 emission allowances, within a horizon of 2 to 5 years. The model simulates 
the impact of this shock on the Spanish economy, paying particular attention to 
sectoral asymmetries arising from the intensity with which different types of energy 
are used in each industry, the interdependencies summarised in the input-output 
2 Various European and international bodies have published evidence on the long-term physical impact of climate 
change. See OECD (2015), G20 (2016), ECB (2019) and European Commission (2020). 
3 See ECB (2021).
4 See Bank of England (2018), ESRB (2016) and ECB (2019).
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tables for the Spanish economy, and the general equilibrium effects in terms of 
relative price changes and sectoral reallocation.5
Section 2 details the main characteristics of the model in question, while Section 3 
discusses the preliminary simulation results and Section 4 presents sensitivity 
exercises for these results. Lastly, Section 5 sets out the conclusions.
2 A sectoral general equilibrium model of the Spanish economy
The banking sector stress tests take as their starting point macroeconomic scenarios 
designed to reflect the possible behaviour of the economy in the event that large 
negative shocks materialise. In later stages, the aggregate variables these scenarios 
provide are used to estimate their effect on bank loan portfolios and balance sheets. 
The scenarios are usually prepared using traditional macroeconomic models, such as 
the Quarterly Macroeconometric Model of the Banco de España (MTBE),6 which 
summarises the historical relationships between the main variables of the Spanish 
economy, e.g. between firms’ investment and the demand or interest rates they face, or 
between household consumption and real disposable income or the unemployment 
rate. That model is a general one, capable of simulating a large variety of possible 
shocks. However, it does not contain the necessary ingredients to prepare a scenario 
that adequately reflects the transition risks. This requires a detailed sectoral breakdown 
and specific details of the energy use and emissions intensity in each industry.
To fill these gaps, a new macroeconomic model has, in recent months, begun to be 
designed specifically to generate these scenarios. The model is still not complete, 
but, as in the case of the MTBE, it probably never will be; instead it will be subject to 
a constant process of renewal and enhancement to adapt it to events and needs as 
they arise. The main features of this model are outlined below. Within the next few 
months, the Banco de España will publish an occasional paper providing more 
technical details of the specification of the current version of the model.7
Inspired by previous developments in the literature,8 the model is a general equilibrium 
one in which agents adjust their decisions according to those of all the other agents. 
In particular, prices and quantities are optimally adjusted, following the prescriptions 
derived from the optimisation problem described for the various model agents (inter 
5 The current model features very rich heterogeneity as regards sectors and input-output table links. However, the 
current version does not have capital or financial frictions, nor is the banking sector explicitly modelled, which 
could be an additional feedback channel. This extension is left for the future. Also, the model focuses on cross-
sector heterogeneity, since it is especially relevant to explaining the different impact of transition risks. There may 
be other levels of intra-sectoral or geographical heterogeneity that are also relevant (as found, for example, by 
Bolton and Kacperczyk (2020)), but they are not reflected in this model and are not explored in this article.
6 See Arencibia, Hurtado, De Luis and Ortega (2017).
7 See Aguilar, González and Hurtado (2021).
8 See, for example, Bouakez, Rachedi and Santoro (2020).
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alia, consumers, producers and retailers). This is the main reason for the difficulty of 
computing the model equilibrium: it is necessary to find the set of prices and 
quantities for all sectors that simultaneously ensures that all agents are at their 
optimal point and that all the aggregate constraints of the economy are satisfied (the 
supply of each product coincides with its demand, the labour firms demand is equal 
to the supply by households, etc.).
One of the main features of the model is its detailed sectoral breakdown. Given that the 
risks associated with climate change have a very marked asymmetric component in 
this respect, it is essential for the model to be capable of capturing the different share 
of energy in the production functions of the various industries, and the interrelations 
between them. Table 1 sets out the sectoral breakdown currently used by the model: 
SECTORS CONSIDERED BY THE MODEL
Table 1
SOURCE: Devised by the authors
Non-energy sectors
edart elaselohw rehtO  72noitcudorp lamina dna porC  1  
edart liater rehtO  82gniggol dna yrtseroF  2  
tropsnart dnaL  92erutlucauqa dna gnihsiF  3  
tropsnart retaW  03gniyrrauq dna gniniM  4  
  5  Manufacture of food, beverages and tobacco products 31  Air transport
  6  Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, leather 32  Warehousing & support activities for transportation
  7  Manufacture of wood and wood products, except furniture 33  Postal and courier activities
  8  Manufacture of paper and paper products 34  Accommodation and food service activities
seitivitca gnihsilbuP  53noitcudorper dna gnitnirP  9  
  10  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 36  Motion picture, video, television, music and radio
  11  Manufacture of pharmaceutical products 37  Telecommunications
  12  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 38  Computer programming and information services
  13  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 39  Financial services, except insurance and pensions
gnidnuf noisnep dna ecnarusnI  04slatem cisab fo erutcafunaM  41  
  15  Manufacture of fabric. metal products, exc. mach. & equip. 41  Auxiliary activities to financial services
  16  Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 42  Real estate activities
  17  Manufacture of electrical equipment 43  Legal and accounting activities
  18  Manufacture of machinery and equipment 44  Architectural and engineering activities
gnisitrevdA  54selcihev rotom fo erutcafunaM  91  
  20  Manufacture of other transport equipment 46  Other professional services
  21  Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing 47  Administrative services
  22  Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 48  Public administration and social security
  23  Water collection, treatment and supply 49  Education
  24  Sewerage & waste collection, treatment & disp. activities 50  Health
seitivitca ecivres rehtO  15noitcurtsnoC  52  
  26  Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles
Energy sectors
  52  Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 53  Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
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MODEL CALIBRATION: SECTORAL DATA ADJUSTMENT
Chart 1
SOURCE: Authors' calculations, based on Eurostat data.
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51 non-energy sectors and two energy production sectors (“fuels” and “electricity”). 
Chart 1 shows how the model calibration precisely replicates the share of each sector 
in household consumption and reasonably approximately (but not exactly, owing to the 
simplifications involved in the stylised form of the aggregator and production functions) 
the share of energy in the inputs of the various non-energy sectors, and the relative size 
of the various industries in terms of value-added and output.
The two energy sectors differ as regards the amount of emission allowances 
associated with each, and also in the way in which the simplified specifications of 
the model relate to the more complex real world structures.
In the case of fuels, their production does not generate a large amount of emissions, 
but their use does; it is the agents who use the fuels that have to acquire the 
associated emission allowances, while the fuel producer receives a price that does 
not include the amount corresponding to such allowances. Electricity, in contrast, 
generates emissions when it is produced, but not necessarily when it is used. Thus, 
electricity users do not need to acquire emission allowances, but simply pay a price 
to electricity producers, who are responsible for obtaining the necessary emission 
allowances to be able to produce that electricity.
In contrast to these real-world idiosyncrasies, in the simplified structure of the model 
both sectors function in the same way: energy users pay a gross price that includes 
the electricity or fuel itself along with the necessary emission allowances to produce 
or consume it, and energy producers receive a net price from which the cost of 
these emission allowances has already been deducted. The fitting of the model to 
the data resolves this divergence between the real-world and model structures: the 
fuel price in the real world corresponds to its net price in the model, while the 
electricity price in the real world corresponds to its gross price in the model.
The difference between the gross price and the net price in the model is generated 
by a tax rate associated with the emissions, which is calibrated with the data available 
for the Spanish economy in the input-output tables and in the industry CO2 
atmospheric emission accounts published by the INE (National Statistics Institute). 
For electricity, the tax rate is obtained from the relationship between the value of the 
emission allowances used by the electricity production sector and the sectors’ 
aggregate revenues, net of these allowances. In the case of fuels, the tax rate is 
estimated by means of the relationship between the value of the emission allowances 
used by all sectors, other than the electricity sector, and the sector’s aggregate 
revenues, net of the allowances it uses. The result is a much higher tax rate associated 
with fuels than with electricity, corresponding to the higher level of emissions 
generated by the production and use of the former.
Figure 1 summarises the structure of the model very succinctly. In the lower right-
hand corner, households choose optimally between consumption and leisure in 
order to maximise a utility function with constant relative risk aversion; that choice 
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will depend on the level of consumption and the relationship between the aggregate 
price and wages. On the right-hand side of the figure, these households purchase a 
homogeneous good from the consumption retailer, who combines energy and non-
energy consumer goods by means of an aggregator function with constant elasticity 
of substitution. Each of these two consumer goods is obtained, in turn, from a retailer 
who aggregates the different kinds of energy and non-energy goods by means of 
the corresponding CES (constant elasticity of substitution) aggregator function. And 
on the left-hand side, there are another 51 retailers of non-energy intermediate 
products with a Cobb-Douglas aggregator function (equivalent to a CES function 
with unit elasticity), and 51 retailers of energy intermediate products with a CES 
aggregator function, who combine the different products in order to sell the basket 
of energy or non-energy intermediate products used by each of the non-energy 
production sectors. In addition to these two baskets of intermediate products, the 
non-energy producers also use employment, combining the three elements by 
means of a nested CES production function. The energy producers in the model use 
a much simpler technology: the only input they use is basic energy products, 
imported at an international price that does not depend on actions taken in the 
domestic economy (in particular, this price should not change when the tax rate 
associated with emissions is raised in the simulation).
The different aggregator and production functions contain numerous parameters that 
allow the degree of substitution between goods to be controlled. In general, almost all 
of them are calibrated at values smaller than one, indicating that some – albeit limited 
– substitution between goods is to be expected in response to the simulated shock. 
This is true for substitution between fuels and electricity, both in the case of consumer 
goods and in that of intermediate products. The value of these elasticity of substitution 
Figure 1
SOURCE:  Devised by the authors.
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parameters must be adjusted to the simulation horizon: a rise in the price of emission 
allowances would not be expected to lead to significant substitution between fuels and 
electricity in the road transport sector within a 3-year period, but could be expected to 
within 15 years. Among the various non-energy intermediate products, substitution is 
one-for-one (Cobb-Douglas aggregator), which means that the quantities react 
proportionately to the relative-price changes, so that the nominal weight of the different 
sectors in the basket of intermediate products acquired by each non-energy producer 
remains constant.9 The only elasticity of substitution calibrated with a value greater 
than one is that of the retailer of non-energy consumer goods: households may 
substantially adjust how they distribute their consumption among the different 
categories of non-energy goods when their relative prices change.
In total, 159 agents interact with one another in the model:
 — 1 representative household.
 — 51 non-energy producers, who use employment, a basket of different 
energy intermediate products and a basket of different non-energy 
intermediate products.
 — 2 energy producers, who use imported basic energy products.
 — 1 consumption aggregator, who combines two products (energy and non-
energy products).
 — 1 energy consumption aggregator, who combines two products (fuels and 
electricity).
 — 1 non-energy consumption aggregator, who combines 51 products (those 
produced by each of the non-energy sectors).
 — 51 energy intermediate product aggregators, each of which combines 2 
energy products (fuels and electricity).
 — 51 non-energy intermediate product aggregators, each of which combines 
51 non-energy products.
Computing the model equilibrium requires finding the 159 prices and the almost 
3,000 quantities that simultaneously satisfy the optimality conditions of all these 
agents and the economy’s aggregate constraints.
9 This level of substitution may be too high for simulations with a short time horizon, so that in future it may be 
desirable to replace these Cobb-Douglas aggregators with aggregators with a constant elasticity of substitution 
of less than one. However, given the large number of variables in this block of the model, the computational 
complexity of the exercise would increase substantially. The result would be a (non-homogeneous) widening of the 
sectoral differences in the simulation (greater impact in almost all sectors that already have especially negative 
effects).
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3 A simple simulation exercise
The model described in the previous section can be used to estimate the effects of 
a rise in the price of CO2 emission allowances. The results will take into account the 
Spanish economy’s production structure (summarised in the input-output tables) 
and the general equilibrium effects in terms of relative price changes and sectoral 
reallocation in production and consumption alike.
In the simulation exercise presented below, the results of which are still very 
provisional, the shock consists of a substantial increase in the tax rate that represents 
the cost of CO2 emission allowances in the model. The price of these allowances 
increased approximately fivefold between summer 2017 and summer 2019, largely 
as a result of regulatory changes designed to reduce excess supply in the market 
and generate greater incentives to reduce emissions, by means of reductions in the 
amounts supplied in allowance auctions and the launch of the Market Stability 
Reserve (MSR) which began to operate in January 2019. As an example of a possible 
intensification of these transition risks, the simulation estimates the impact of a 
further increase of similar magnitude, from €33 per tonne of CO2 emitted (the market 
price at the beginning of 2021) to €165 per tonne.
Under a relatively standard calibration, this shock gives rise in the model to a sharp 
reduction in the use of energy in consumption and production alike. This reduction 
is greater in the case of fuels, the use of which is reduced by 34%, than in that of 
electricity (down 19%), which is less emissions intensive.
The aggregate effects of the shock are negative: employment falls by 2.3% and real 
GDP by 3%. However the cross-sector dispersion is high: some sectors suffer much 
more severe falls than the average, while a few are even favoured. In general, the 
sectors most prejudiced by the increase in emission costs are the most energy-
intensive ones, but significant non-linear second-round effects are observed in the 
simulation. Thus, there are sectors with relatively similar emission shares that are 
affected very differently, depending on the other sectors with which they are most 
interrelated. A sector that generates limited emissions may be strongly affected if it 
uses many intermediate products from energy-intensive sectors (their costs increase) 
or if a significant portion of its sales are to such sectors (their demand falls). 
Calibration of the model with input-output table data for Spain ensures that these 
relationships are realistically captured.
Chart 2 shows the relationship between the level of emissions of each non-energy 
sector and the impact of the simulation, in terms of real value-added and output. The 
energy sectors, which are not shown in these charts, are clearly the ones most 
affected. Since the results are still preliminary and will be revised in future, the chart 
does not indicate which observations correspond to which sectors.
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In response to the shock, all the productive sectors substantially reduce the amount 
of energy they use, but the effect is strongest in the most polluting sectors, which 
not only reduce their output to a greater extent, but also make larger cuts to the 
share of energy in the set of intermediate products they use. This result is illustrated 
in Chart 3.
Aggregate household consumption also falls considerably. This decline in 
consumption is seen in practically every sector (see Chart 4), but the fall is most 
marked in those products that become relatively more expensive in response to the 
shock.
EFFECT ON THE VARIOUS SECTORS OF THE INCREASE IN THE COST OF EMISSIONS
Chart 2
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EFFECT OF THE INCREASE IN THE COST OF EMISSIONS ON ENERGY INTENSITY
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Overall, the simulation generates the results expected, in the sense that the sectors 
most prejudiced by the increase in the price of emission allowances are those with 
the highest emissions, but it also has interesting non-linear effects, associated with 
the interrelations between sectors reflected in the input-output matrix.
4 Sensitivity of the results to changes in some parameters
Especially as regards their quantification, the results of the simulation presented in 
the previous section depend crucially on the broad set of parameters with which the 
model is calibrated and the structures represented therein. This section presents 
two sensitivity exercises around the baseline simulation: first, the way in which the 
emission-cost increase is implemented is changed; and second, the parameters 
that regulate the degree of product substitution in firms’ production functions and in 
consumers’ utility function are modified.
In the version of the model used in the previous section, agents are refunded the 
cost of emission allowances through lump-sum transfers to households, a simple 
way of approximating any real-world mechanism in which the allocation of emission 
allowances and the effects on household income do not depend on households’ 
future actions. This assumption gives rise to a particularly pessimistic scenario: 
regulatory changes may also be implemented so that the higher cost of emissions 
generates an increase in government revenues that allows the negative shock arising 
from the increase in emission costs to be offset by other tax changes that may partly 
mitigate its negative effects. Given that the aim of these simulation exercises is to 
generate macroeconomic scenarios that serve as a starting point for the performance 
of climate-change stress tests for the banking sector, it is reasonable to use 
assumptions that amplify the negative effects of the shock. However, this is not 
necessarily the most likely scenario.
Chart 5 presents the results of an alternative simulation in which the regulatory 
change is implemented in such a way as to minimise transition costs: the cost of 
emissions is raised by means of a tax that increases government revenues, allowing 
other distorting taxes to be reduced (in this case, the tax on household wage income). 
This affects the household choice between leisure and work, generating a positive 
supply-side shock (an increase in labour supply) that combines with the negative 
one (associated directly with the increase in emission costs). Depending on the 
calibration of the wage elasticity of labour supply, the net result may be, as in this 
simulation, expansionary: both employment and GDP increase, the negative impact 
on the sectors that generate most emissions is reduced and a considerable number 
of industries are benefited by the shock. These industries generate limited emissions 
and do not heavily depend, either through their purchases or sales, on sectors that 
generate large emissions, so that they are not significantly affected by the increase 
in emission costs, although they are benefited by the higher labour supply (and by a 
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fall in their prices relative to other sectors, which was already present in the simulation 
in the previous section).
As compared with the fall of 34% and 19% in the use of fuels and electricity under 
the baseline simulation, this scenario with reduced taxes on employment income 
generates somewhat lower reductions of 29% and 13%. However the cost in terms 
of employment and GDP is completely eliminated, which means it is possible to 
implement a larger increase in emission costs until the same emissions-reduction 
effects are achieved, without the economic costs at aggregate level (although there 
are still significant negative effects for some sectors).
A second dimension in which sensitivity exercises need to be performed is that of 
the elasticities of substitution between goods. As mentioned in the previous section, 
the sectors most affected by the increase in emission costs are those most dependent 
on the use of fuels. In the long-term, the elasticity of substitution between types of 
energy will be higher, allowing these sectors to substitute, to a greater extent, 
electricity for fuels, or inputs that require less energy for those that use a large 
amount of energy. In any event, the CO2 emissions associated with their productive 
processes will be cut and, therefore, the contractionary effect of the shock reduced. 
The results of an alternative simulation with a higher elasticity of substitution are 
shown in Chart 6.
This higher elasticity of substitution reduces the sectoral heterogeneity, giving rise 
to a more uniform effect across sectors. The sectors that were prejudiced in the 
baseline simulation are still the ones that decline most in this version with a higher 
elasticity of substitution, and the sectors benefited are also still the same ones, but 
ALTERNATIVE SIMULATION WITH REDUCTION OF TAXES ON LABOUR INCOME
Chart 5
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the difference between the former and the latter is significantly reduced. When this 
scale difference is corrected, the shape of the cloud of dots is similar but not identical 
to the original: the change in the elasticity of substitution generates moderately non-
linear effects which depend on the productive structure and sectoral interrelations.
5 Conclusions
Both climate change and the policies implemented to counter it may have negative 
effects on the economy, which would be transmitted to financial institutions through 
their exposure to the firms and sectors most affected. These risks should be 
assessed with a view to mitigating and preventing their impact on financial stability. 
For this purpose, various institutions, including the Banco de España, have begun to 
prepare climate-change stress tests for banks, to identify actions to reduce the 
probability of the most unfavourable events.
As an initial ingredient, such stress tests require macroeconomic scenarios that 
capture the effect on the economy of possible adverse shocks. This article has 
presented a model specifically designed to build such scenarios. The model focuses 
on the transition risks, associated with the regulatory measures applied to check 
climate change, as these are the most important ones over relatively short time 
horizons. And since the effects of these risks are foreseeably highly asymmetric 
across sectors, the model is highly granular and stresses the interrelations described 
by the input-output tables for the Spanish economy and the general equilibrium 
effects in terms of relative-price changes and substitution between intermediate 
ALTERNATIVE SIMULATION WITH HIGHER ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION
Chart 6
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products in firms’ production functions, and between types of consumption in the 
household utility function. Physical risks (arising from climate change itself) remain 
for a subsequent development, which will require a different model, more focused 
on the long term and probably less sectorally disaggregated.
This article has presented a still-preliminary version of this sectoral model for 
transition risks. In the short term, the focus will be on improving the model to fit other 
aspects of the observed data and on increasing the flexibility of the options for the 
parameters defining the elasticity of substitution between goods in the various 
aggregator, production and consumption functions. Further ahead, the model could 
be expanded to convert it into an open economy model, with exports and with 
imports in addition to those of basic energy goods, and to include capital in the 
production function, enhancing the realism with which the model fits the data and 
allowing effects on assets used by firms as loan collateral to be incorporated into the 
simulations.
Even in its current simpler version, the model already quite closely approximates the 
productive structure of the Spanish economy and allows reasonably realistic 
simulations to be formulated, in which the sectors most affected by a rise in the price 
of emissions are those that use energy inputs more intensively, while at the same 
time reflecting the non-linear effects generated by the interrelations between sectors 
in a general equilibrium structure.
The model allows certain key factors for designing policies to combat climate change 
to be identified and, in particular, highlights the importance of designing fiscal 
instruments and regulatory mechanisms to achieve emission reduction objectives at 
the lowest possible economic cost. Notwithstanding this, the results of the 
simulations also show that, even in the best scenarios, risks remain for certain 
sectors that would be prejudiced by a disorderly transition, even if environmental 
policies are implemented through tax structures that include compensation to 
eliminate adverse effects at the aggregate level. The climate change stress tests for 
banks will attempt to ensure that the financial stability risks associated with these 
shocks are minimised.
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